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ABSTRACT 
Effectively capturing opportunities requires rapid decision-making. We investigate the speed 
of opportunity evaluation decisions by focusing on firms’ venture termination and venture 
advancement decisions. Experience, standard operating procedures, and confidence allow 
firms to make opportunity evaluation decisions faster; we propose that a firm’s attentional 
orientation, as reflected in its project portfolio, limits the number of domains in which these 
speed-enhancing mechanisms can be developed. Hence firms’ decision speed is likely to vary 
between different types of decisions. Using unique data on 3,269 mineral exploration ventures 
in the Australian mining industry, we find that firms with a higher degree of attention toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities are quicker to abandon potential opportunities in early 
development but slower to do so later, and that such firms are also slower to advance on 
potential opportunities at all stages compared to firms that focus their attention differently. 
Market dynamism moderates these relationships, but only with regard to initial evaluation 
decisions. Our study extends research on decision speed by showing that firms are not 
necessarily fast or slow regarding all the decisions they make, and by offering an opportunity 
evaluation framework that recognizes that decision makers can, in fact often do, pursue 
multiple potential opportunities simultaneously.  
 
 
Keywords: Opportunity; Portfolio; Speed; Decision making; Opportunity Evaluation; 
Prospecting; Discovery; Exploration; Exploitation; New Ventures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The exploration and exploitation of potential opportunities is critical to firm 
performance (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Ireland, Hitt, Camp & Sexton, 2001; Sirmon, Hitt 
& Ireland, 2007). Consequently, the concept of opportunities has emerged as a central notion 
in a number of fields of research, including entrepreneurship (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), 
strategic management (Foss, Lyngsie & Zahra, 2013; Suarez, Grodal & Gotsopoulos, 2014), 
and institutional theory (Battilana & Casciaro, 2012; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Despite the 
progress we have made toward understanding opportunities and the manner in which they are 
explored and exploited, most prior research has assumed that actors typically identify and 
assess a single opportunity at a time (Gruber, MacMillan & Thompson, 2008). Recent 
research, however, has found that firms often identify multiple potential opportunities 
simultaneously (e.g., Barreto, 2012; Gruber et al., 2008; 2013). In fact, firms that identify 
multiple potential opportunities simultaneously may be able to select the most favorable 
market conditions for launching their products (Gruber et al., 2008).  
While evaluating opportunities is a critical organizational activity (Bingham & 
Eisenhardt, 2011), it is far from easy. Many companies nowadays are faced with an 
abundance of heterogeneous opportunities (Bingham, Eisenhardt & Furr, 2011). Cognitive 
limits preclude actors from collecting complete data to sort through these options effectively 
(Ocasio, 1997; Shane, 2000), particularly in more dynamic environments in which the 
decision-making context is “more complex, more ambiguous, and less predictable” (Davis, 
Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2009: 414). Hence opportunity evaluation is extraordinarily 
challenging. Exacerbating this challenge is the fact that opportunities are inherently fleeting 
(Short, Ketchen, Shook & Ireland, 2009); hence, speed is crucial to their capture (Choi, 
Lévesque & Shepherd, 2008). Waiting for ready-made opportunities to materialize means 
risking being too late as “the most attractive opportunities will have already been captured” 
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(Bingham et al., 2011: 77). As a result, not only do firms, with their future at stake, need to 
sort through an abundance of complex, uncertain opportunities on the basis of incomplete 
data—they  need to do so fast. What then, determines the speed at which firms make 
opportunity evaluation decisions in a multi-opportunity context? 
Prior research has offered a number of important insights into this matter, identifying 
possible antecedents to firms’ decision-making speed (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005; 
Kownatzki, Walter, Floyd & Lechner, 2014) and relating decision speed to firm performance 
(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Baum & Wally, 2003). By focusing on single decisions (e.g., 
by asking respondents to focus on and describe the most significant strategic decision made 
over the last two years [Forbes, 2005; Judge & Miller, 1991]), previous research has typically 
looked for factors that increase decision speed in general (Baum & Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Forbes, 2005; Judge & Miller, 1991). However, there are reasons to suggest that 
decision speed may not be a fixed attribute but rather an attribute that varies by the type of 
decision and the internal and external contexts in which the decision is made. Polaroid, for 
example, was proactive in seizing the instant camera market, quick in its responses to defend 
it against new entrants, and quick to develop manufacturing capabilities in this area. 
However, at the same time, it was notoriously slow at developing and marketing new 
products, particularly in digital imaging, and at letting go of losing ventures (Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000). This example points to the more nuanced notion that any one firm can be 
quick to make some decisions but slow to make others. This more nuanced notion of decision 
speed has been largely neglected by previous research on decision-making speed and 
opportunity pursuit. 
In relation to the above, the purpose of this paper is to increase our understanding of 
how firms make specific types of venturing decisions more quickly or more slowly in a multi-
opportunity context. We draw on the behavioral decision-making literature (Cyert & March, 
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1963; Levitt & March, 1988; March & Shapira, 1987) to identify a set of mechanisms that 
speed decision making in complex situations given bounded rationality. Using Cho and 
Hambrick’s (2006) notion of attentional orientation, we propose that an attentional orientation 
toward certain stages of opportunity advancement (ranging from a relatively higher degree of 
attention toward earlier-stage exploration activities and related evaluation decisions to a 
relatively higher degree of attention toward later-stage exploitation activities and related 
evaluation decisions) influences decision speed, and does so differently for venture 
termination and venture advancement decisions made at different stages of evaluation. 
Specifically, we propose that a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage exploration 
activities, as reflected in a firm’s venture portfolio, allows for the accumulation of specific 
experience (Levitt & March, 1988), the development of standard operating procedures (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Gavetti, Levinthal & Ocasio, 2007), and the gain of domain-specific 
confidence (Levitt & March, 1988; March & Shapira, 1987). However, as attention is a 
limited resource because of human and organizational constraints (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Ocasio, 1997), the domains in which a firm develops experience, standard operating 
procedures, and confidence are likely limited by where it focuses the majority of its decision 
makers’ attention. As a consequence, we propose that a higher degree of attention toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities is likely to increase the speed of decisions that relate to 
early-stage exploration but not so to the same extent for other types of decisions. Hence, our 
framework departs from the notion that firms are necessarily fast or slow in general. 
Furthermore, as stated above, opportunity evaluation is particularly challenging in a dynamic 
environment. Moreover, environmental dynamism attenuates the effects of experience, 
standard operating procedures, and confidence (Levitt & March, 1988; Tripsas & Gavetti, 
2000), and therefore is likely to moderate the effect of attention on decision speed. For this 
reason, we will investigate the contingent effect of environmental dynamism. Our empirical 
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focus is on the venture portfolios of mining firms, which represents a setting in which critical 
decisions about a focal potential opportunity are taken in the context of other possible 
opportunities. 
We aim to make two key contributions with our work. First, contributing to theories of 
opportunities and opportunity evaluation (e.g., Haynie, Shepherd & McMullen, 2009; Wood, 
McKelvie & Haynie, 2014; Wood & Williams, 2014), we theorize and empirically 
demonstrate that the simultaneous pursuit of multiple possible opportunities influences 
decision making regarding a focal venture. Complementing recent research that has studied 
choice sets that are external to the firm prior to market entry (e.g., Gruber et al., 2008; 2013), 
we consider a firm’s internal choice set—namely, potential opportunities already under some 
form of active consideration—and study how this internal choice set influences evaluation 
decisions at multiple stages within the opportunity-advancement process. In so doing, we 
shed new light on the process nature of opportunity evaluation, hence meeting recent calls to 
abandon a static view of opportunities (Dimov, 2011; Short et al., 2009) in favor of trying to 
understand their temporal dynamics (McMullen & Dimov, 2013; Short et al., 2009). 
Second, we contribute to the literature on decision-making speed. As we mentioned, 
the literature on decision making has typically viewed speed as a general firm attribute (Baum 
& Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005; Judge & Miller, 1991). By distinguishing 
between different types of decisions at different stages, we uncover that conventional 
mechanisms related to decision speed do not necessarily increase firms’ overall or intrinsic 
speed; instead, we offer and empirically substantiate a theory that proposes that attentional 
orientation determines the domains in which such mechanisms are developed and thus only 
increases decision speed within these domains. This more nuanced notion adds an important 
contingency to our understanding of decision speed and helps resolve the inconsistency 
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between extant theory and an empirical reality in which firms regularly act quickly and 
decisively regarding some issues but not regarding others.   
MINERAL MINING AS A SETTING OF STAGED OPPORTUNITY EVALUATION 
Research in entrepreneurship (e.g. Ardichvili, Cardozo & Ray, 2003; Bhave, 1994; 
Shane, 2001) and innovation (e.g., Urban & Hauser, 1993; Veryzer, 1998) have offered 
various stage models of new product and new venture development, which typically involve 
stages of information gathering and analysis to determine if the venture should proceed to the 
next stage (Cooper, 2008). Subsequent advancement decisions typically involve an increasing 
and often irreversible commitment of resources, but as the process unfolds, uncertainty is 
often reduced (Burgelman, 1983; McGrath, 1999). In pharmaceutical drug testing (Wolfe & 
Shepherd, 2014), for example, the advancement of new molecular entities goes through a 
stage-gate funnelling process that starts from a pre-discovery phase that involves screening 
5,000-10,000 potential target compounds, then proceeds with 200 to 300 of these compounds 
advancing to pre-clinical testing (which further narrows the list to the most promising five to 
ten compounds), and concludes with a phase of extensive clinical trials in the hope of finding 
one viable new drug. 
Sequential staging of investments in a focal venture is a means of managing 
uncertainty by ensuring that subsequent investments are only made if the venture shows 
promise; if the venture does not show promise then it can be terminated and the firm’s 
valuable resources redirected to those portfolio ventures that do (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; 
McGrath, 1999). Although the sequential staging of investment appears linear, the innovation 
process underlying it often involves much iteration within, and sometimes across, stages 
(Archdivilli et al., 2003; Cooper, 2008). Moreover, it appears that decision makers tend to 
“shift their thinking as they transition between the various phases of the entrepreneurial 
process” (Wood & Williams, 2014: 575).   
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In this paper we set our theorizing in the mining industry, a context in which staged 
opportunity evaluation decisions are of critical importance. Consistent with Eckhardt and 
Shane (2003) and Shane and Venkataraman (2000), we define opportunities as situations that 
allow for new goods, services, raw materials, or organizing processes to be introduced in such 
a way that the benefits exceed the value of the resources invested.1 In mineral mining, 
opportunities take the form of ore bodies that can be systematically assessed, and mining 
firms typically confront multiple such opportunities at any given point in time. Decisions 
pertaining to the advancement or termination of a mine are of critical importance. As one 
mining executive told us “these decisions are neither trivial nor simple. In fact, they are 
absolutely critical make-or-break decisions for any mining company.”  
Mining companies usually pursue multiple potential opportunities simultaneously, 
building a portfolio of mining ventures and moving them through a stage-gate development 
process, with the successful management of this process being one of their primary tasks. 
Figure 1 presents a model of the stages of opportunity evaluation in mining. By characterizing 
the process in terms of prospecting, developing, and exploiting, Figure 1 focuses attention on 
opportunity evaluation decisions at specific stages—advancement from prospecting to 
developing and from developing to exploiting—and also on termination decisions.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Prospecting is the first stage of the process. It involves grassroots exploration to 
detect signals of potential opportunities in a location, which may be physical, i.e., a 
geographical area, or conceptual, e.g., a sector of an industry, a set of information channels, a 
technological invention, or a latent market need. In mining, the process begins with the 
exploration of probable potential zones (Rasheed et al., 2012) through attempts to detect 
                                                            
1 As the benefits of any potential opportunity cannot be known ex ante, decision makers take action based on 
beliefs they form about opportunities—hence in this paper we will often refer to “potential opportunities” rather 
than just “opportunities” (see McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). 
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anomalies that signal a potential opportunity. The economic feasibility of a mining venture, 
however, is difficult to determine at this stage (Eggert, 1993). One of the managing directors 
we interviewed in conducting this study described the nature of prospecting using as an 
example Excalibur2, a venture started with remote radar imaging followed by on-site 
exploration:  
“This image came from space radar on the NASA shuttle. Basically it hit the ground 
with radar pulses so it actually built up a topographical map ... What this allowed 
you to do was to wind up the game digitally so you could make mole hills look like 
mountains. ... What happened in this area [pointing to a map] … just in there is an 
embayment and there have been a lot of rivers coming into that. These rivers 
delivered a lot of titanium onto the coast. ... No one has ever explored this; no one 
had ever been there. ... We [leased] 40,000 square kilometers. We decided to go in 
deep and we took over an enormous area. … I was the first white man to walk 
across the sand ridges there and basically say ‘Right we are on a shore line’. I could 
see the sand dropping down about 50-60 meters and I could see the old land form 
going around and I thought: ‘I’m on the coast, I need to drill here.’”  
This example of prospecting in the mining industry has important similarities with 
early-stage exploration of new products and new markets in other industries. For example, 
firms in the optical disk industry often engage in grassroots exploration of new territories—
not geographical ones, but new knowledge domains external to the firm and distant from 
current technology (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). This kind of early-stage exploration can be 
done by probing into the future by means of experimental products and exploratory R&D 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; McGrath, 1999). The prospecting stage ends with a decision to 
terminate the venture or with a decision to progress to stage two: developing.  
Developing is about advanced exploration of the signals detected through prospecting 
in an attempt to generate further information about the feasibility and desirability of the 
potential opportunity for the focal actor. The stakes and the commitment are higher in this 
stage than in the previous one. In mining, feasibility studies include drilling exploratory holes 
to estimate the quantity of ore at the site. This comes at considerable financial cost. Whereas 
                                                            
2 For reasons of confidentiality, we refer to the project described here, and in other interviews from which we 
take excerpts, by the pseudonym Excalibur. The names of the persons we interviewed have also been changed.  
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the typical amounts of investments associated with prospecting might range from USD .02 
to15 million, the costs of developing lie in the USD 10 to 500 million range (Hartman & 
Mutmansky, 2002). Estimates are also made of the cost of extracting the ore given its depth 
and the nature of surrounding rock, and of the cost of delivering the ore to market. These 
costs will be weighed against the potential revenue from the mine. Again, a parallel can be 
drawn between mining and other settings. In the case of new products, developing requires 
collecting information on potential market demand (Chrisman & McMullan, 2000) and 
production costs (Ardichvili et al., 2003), and assessing the opportunity’s value creating 
capability (Ardichvili et al., 2003). However, at this stage there is not yet a full commitment 
to a given business model, product, or target market. To continue with the Excalibur project: 
“We had our own drilling, our own crews. We had a depot down here with a small 
laboratory in it.... We drilled and it took us two weeks. The third week I said to the 
geologist, ‘How long will we be here?’ He said, ‘Two more days’ and I said ‘Go 
down to the bottom. The best will be in line six’. And he drilled in line six and 
through the deposit and on the radio the next day he said: ‘Bob, we struck it, we 
have a mine.’”   
Exploiting, stage three of the process, involves building efficient, full scale operations 
for products or services created by, or derived from, an opportunity (Choi et al., 2008; Choi & 
Shepherd, 2004). In the mining industry, exploitation takes the form of investments to extract 
resources for profit (Register of Australian Mining, 2012), such as excavation equipment, 
crushers, leaching tanks, filters, striping vessels, furnaces, moulds, and transportation. Usually 
the investment is substantial and cannot be recouped without incurring considerable cost. 
Exploitation also involves a different repertoire of operating procedures than that of the other 
stages. This is also true in the case of any radically new product as effective exploitation often 
involves establishing efficient production systems, instituting new routines, and investing in 
scale for efficient production (Dobrev & Carroll, 2003). 
As we mentioned, mining ventures can be terminated at any stage during the process. 
By terminating a venture we mean ceasing activities related to the venture and divesting its 
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resources including the layoff or reassignment of employees (Shepherd, Patzelt, Williams & 
Warnecke, 2014). In mining this usually involves rehabilitating the surface and selling the 
land-lease or returning it to the government before walking away from the site. Only a small 
number of prospects eventually makes it all the way to the exploitation stage; typically over 
90% are terminated somewhere along the way.  
Overall then, the model depicted in Figure 1 can be viewed as a sequence of staged 
evaluation decisions on a venture that progresses from early-stage exploration (prospecting) 
to later-stage exploration (developing), and finally to exploitation. Hence there are some 
important similarities with March’s (1991) exploration-exploitation framework, which has 
been widely applied in organizational learning (e.g., Holmqvist, 2004), search (e.g., Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002), and adaptation (e.g., Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006). At the venture level, 
exploration-exploitation is typically viewed in terms of sequential stages (Block & 
MacMillan, 1985), in which actors “attempt to reduce their ignorance about technology and 
market through knowledge accumulation arising from experimentation and search such as 
market research on customer demand and further development and testing of technologies” 
(Choi et al., 2008: 335). Depending on what is considered to be positive information revealed 
through exploration, the venture can progress to exploitation. Each of these general phases 
can consist of multiple milestones.  
At the organizational level, exploration and exploitation have been viewed as 
fundamental activities which, certainly in capital intensive settings like mining, compete for 
scarce resources (March, 1991). As a consequence, firms make implicit and explicit choices 
between the two (Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; March, 1991). Some firms may orient their 
resources primarily toward ventures focused on early-stage exploration, e.g., start a mining 
venture from buying a lease and prospecting, and then either developing the venture further, 
or terminating it, whereas other firms may orient their resources primarily toward ventures 
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focused on development, or those focused on exploitation, in which case the initial 
exploration phase has been performed by another firm. Yet others may choose a more 
balanced or mixed portfolio approach that falls somewhere in between (Hoffmann, 2007).  
While in our model exploration comes before exploitation, the balance between the 
two can be achieved at the level of the industry as a whole rather than at the level of each 
individual organization (Gupta et al., 2006; March, 1991). That is, mining firms can survive 
by focusing on certain stages of the opportunity process, such that some organizations can 
focus on exploration of new deposits, while others who focus on exploitation, can access 
already existing opportunities at a later stage of development through acquisition. This is 
similar to the dynamics of other industries, like the pharmaceutical industry (Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004) and the semi-conductor industry (Gupta et al., 2006). But also IT firms like 
Cisco tend to engage in acquisition of small ventures to keep their business opportunity 
portfolio filled. In the following, we will elaborate further on one central element of 
successful portfolio management, namely the speed of making opportunity evaluation 
decisions. 
ATTENTION TOWARD EARLY-STAGE EXPLORATION AND THE SPEED OF 
OPPORTUNITY EVALUATION DECISIONS 
Decision Making Speed and Opportunity Pursuit 
Decision speed is often thought of as “how quickly organizations execute all aspects 
of the decision making process” (Forbes, 2005: 355) and has been associated with superior 
firm performance (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt, 
1989; for an exception see Perlow, Okhuysen & Repenning, 2002). Decision speed enhances 
performance by enabling firms to exploit an opportunity before that opportunity disappears 
(Baum & Wally, 2003; Forbes, 2005; Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985). Furthermore, decision 
making to exploit an opportunity helps signal to stakeholders that the firm is proactive and 
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adaptable (Langley, 1995), enhances organizational learning (i.e., by making fast decisions 
the firm can make a greater number of decisions in a given time period, which provides a 
greater set of interactions and experiences that reveal information important for organizational 
learning [Baum & Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005]), and can provide either a 
first mover advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) or a series of transient advantages 
(McGrath, 2013). In particular, decision speed has been found to be important in dealing with 
dynamic environments (Baum & Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Judge & Miller, 
1991), yet making fast decisions in such contexts is highly challenging as dynamism increases 
the difficulty of understanding the market to inform the decision making process (Priem, 
Rasheed & Kotulic, 1995).3 As a consequence, a “central debate in the strategy, organization, 
and entrepreneurship literature surrounds how leaders effectively manage their organization 
and strategies in dynamic environments” (Eisenhardt, Furr & Bingham, 2010: 1263).  
Decision makers can increase decision speed through, for example, the use of real 
time information, the development and consideration of more alternatives, reliance on 
intuition based on experience, and the use of active conflict resolution (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Decision speed is also enhanced when decision makers are relatively younger (Forbes, 2005), 
when they use heuristics for capturing opportunities (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011), have 
their decision making guided by routines (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
rely on their intuition (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miller & Ireland, 2005; Wally & Baum, 1994), and 
when they draw on prior experience (Forbes, 2005).  
The literature thus provides considerable insight into the importance of decision speed 
for grasping fleeting opportunities, its consequences for firm performance, and the 
antecedents to a firm’s decision-making speed. However, extant literature has often 
considered a firm’s decision speed to be relatively universal, instead of varying within a firm 
                                                            
3 Environmental dynamism and velocity are different constructs but are “closely related in practice” (Baum & 
Wally, 2003: 1110). 
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across decisions (e.g., Baum & Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005; Judge & Miller, 
1991). As such, it does not yet provide a deep insight into the decision making speed of 
different evaluation decisions at various stages of the opportunity advancement process.  
To address this, we focus on the critical role of attention (Ocasio, 1997). Although 
largely overlooked in prior research on decision speed, we believe the concept is relevant 
because decision makers can, and in fact often do, consider multiple potential opportunities 
simultaneously (Barreto, 2012; Gruber et al., 2008; 2013) yet they are boundedly rational and 
have limited attentional capacity (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1947). Hence when 
confronted with potentially large and complex choice sets, decision makers cannot give full 
attention to all issues concurrently; attention is likely to be focused on a limited set of issues 
(Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010; Ocasio, 2011). We will hypothesize that firms are able to 
develop the speed-enhancing mechanisms that prior literature has identified predominantly in 
areas in which their attention is focused. In so doing, we offer an explanation for how it can 
be that firms can make quick decisions in some situations, but make slow decisions in others. 
We adopt Cho and Hambrick’s (2006) concept of attentional orientation, which in turn 
draws on Ocasio’s work on attention (1997, 2011), and apply it to a firm’s degree of attention 
toward certain stages of opportunity advancement; ranging from a relatively higher degree of 
attention toward earlier-stage exploration activities and related evaluation decisions, to a 
relatively higher degree of attention toward later-stage exploitation activities and related 
evaluation decisions. Firms with a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage exploration 
activities are likely to face a different set of issues than firms focused more on the 
development or exploitation of potential opportunities. For example, exploration focuses 
attention on searching for something new through a constant probing of the environment for 
signals of new wealth-creating opportunities (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; McGrath, 1999), 
whereas at the other extreme, exploitation focuses attention on existing opportunities and the 
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skills and resources needed to leverage them (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). We will 
empirically capture a firm’s degree of attention toward certain stages of opportunity 
advancement by observing its venture portfolio, representing the firm’s observable strategic 
choices (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) between alternatives that result from, and are based on, 
attentional orientations. 
Theoretical Mechanisms 
Our central thesis is that a firm’s degree of attention toward certain stages of 
opportunity advancement influences the relative speed of its decisions about a focal potential 
opportunity. Rooted in the behavioral decision making literature (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Levitt & March, 1988; March & Shapira, 1987), our framework is built on three mechanisms: 
experience (Levitt & March, 1988; Ocasio, 1997), standard operating procedures (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 2007; Ocasio, 1997) and confidence (Levitt & March, 1988; 
March & Shapira, 1987). 
Experience. Through the repeated execution of certain tasks and the recurring 
activation of routines, firms gain experience and learn (Levitt & March, 1988). Because of the 
differences in critical activities, firms with a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage 
exploration activities are likely to develop and possess a different set of experiences than 
firms whose attention is focused on later-stage development and/or exploitation. For example, 
early-stage exploration involves search, discovery and experimentation, whereas at the other 
end of the spectrum exploitation involves refinement, implementation, and execution (March, 
1991). These domain-specific experiences are likely to influence the speed of decision 
making. Specifically, actors with domain-relevant experience are likely to spend less time 
gathering information, because they already have a stock of knowledge on which to draw 
(Forbes, 2005). Furthermore, actors with domain-relevant experience are likely to more 
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quickly analyze information because they have an organizing framework in place that 
“facilitates the storage, recall, and interpretation of data” (Forbes, 2005: 358). 
Standard Operating Procedures. Over time, firms tend to develop standard 
organizational practices, programs, and procedures (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 
2007). They can be thought of as a set of behavioral rules learned through attempts to adapt to 
operating conditions (Cyert & March, 1963). Having proposed that varying attentional 
orientations channel actors toward different experiences, we also see them as being likely to 
lead to the development of different types of operating procedures. Practices and procedures 
related to prospecting include, for example, how to allocate slack resources to investigate 
potential opportunities (George, 2005), how to normalize small failures and learn from small 
losses (Sitkin, 1992), and how to efficiently redeploy resources from one venture to another 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). In contrast, the practices and procedures related to exploitation 
include, for example, procedures for managing risk and maintaining strategic congruence 
(Greve, 2007; March, 1991), refining existing technologies and achieving efficiency (Csaszar, 
2013; March, 1991), and ramping up operations to achieve economies of scale and scope 
(Lavie et al., 2010). Standard operating procedures guide the decisions organizations make 
(Cyert & March, 1963) and influence their speed. Standard operating practices and 
procedures permit the transfer of past learning, which can then be re-applied to new contexts 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Also they can set the rules for how to collect, filter and process 
information (Cyert & March, 1963).  
Confidence. Not only does the focusing of attention on specific tasks build domain-
specific experience and generate standard operating procedures, it also enhances decision 
makers’ confidence within that domain (Levitt & March, 1988; March & Shapira, 1987).  
Confidence refers to “the strength of belief in the goodness, accuracy, and appropriateness of 
one’s judgments” (Budescu & Yu, 2007: 154). By focusing attention toward earlier-stage 
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exploration activities, decision makers are likely to be relatively more engaged in the 
collection, analysis, and evaluation of information related to prospecting ventures. Domain-
specific knowledge and the organization of this knowledge is likely to enhance confidence in 
making decisions in this domain (cf. Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985). Confidence helps decision 
makers sufficiently overcome the anxiety of an uncertain situation (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and to “act quickly and decisively” (Judge & Miller, 1991: 450; 
Baum & Wally, 2003; Levitt & March, 1988). 
HYPOTHESES 
Firms’ Degree of Attention toward Earlier-Stage Exploration and Decision Speed 
On the basis of the above framework, we expect that a higher degree of attention 
toward earlier-stage exploration activities, as reflected in a firm’s venture portfolio, influences 
decision making speed. Our model (see Figure 1) distinguishes between two important types 
of opportunity evaluation decisions, venture termination and venture advancement, at two 
different stages of the process, prospecting and developing. 
Prospecting Stage. Firms with a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage 
exploration activities are likely to gain experience, develop standard operating procedures, 
and build confidence related to exploration. One key exploration activity is to terminate 
unpromising ventures early (McGrath, 1999). Because of the greater variability of possible 
outcomes, exploration through early-stage ventures is inherently more uncertain and more 
likely to result in failure than the exploration of later-stage ventures (Gupta et al., 2006; 
McGrath, 1999). As a result, firms with a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage 
exploration activities are frequently confronted with having to make the decision to terminate 
a venture at an early stage. Therefore, such firms are more likely to gain experience relevant 
to dealing with these ventures, and to develop more standard operating procedures for early 
fault detection and termination (McGrath, 1999) than those with an attentional orientation 
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toward later-stage exploration or exploitation. In addition, they are likely to be quicker to 
obtain and process domain specific information (Forbes, 2005), and be more confident in 
using it (Judge & Miller, 1991) to decide on the fate of a focal prospecting venture. We 
expect that this will increase the speed at which such firms terminate ventures at the 
prospecting stage. 
Venture advancement at the prospecting stage requires a different set of experiences, 
standard operating procedures, and base of confidence. Indeed, venture advancement differs 
from venture termination in a number of respects. First, a decision to advance a venture is less 
about limiting downside risk and more about capturing upside potential (Bowman & Hurry, 
1993; McGrath, 1999). Venture advancement from prospecting to developing requires 
investment of capital for a previously identified opportunity—an initial choice of one venture 
over others. It thus constitutes a step toward opportunity exploitation (Choi et al., 2008). 
Compared to firms focused on later-stage development and exploitation, those with a higher 
degree of attention toward earlier-stage exploration activities are less likely to attend to 
information pointing toward the upside potential of a venture, or have the relevant experience, 
operating procedures, and confidence to facilitate speedy advancement of the venture.  
The above leads us to expect that an attentional orientation toward earlier stages of 
opportunity advancement will allow firms to make some decisions more quickly, but not all 
decisions per se. Specifically, based on our reasoning we offer our first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: In the prospecting stage, a stronger attentional orientation toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities (a) increases the speed of venture termination 
decisions, but (b) decreases the speed of venture advancement decisions. 
 
Developing Stage. A staged perspective can reveal that seemingly similar phenomena 
may take on different meanings at different stages (Eckhardt & Ciuchta, 2008; McMullen & 
Dimov, 2013). The effect of an attentional orientation toward earlier-stage ventures on the 
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speed with which a firm makes decisions at the developing stage differs from that at the 
prospecting stage in two important ways.  
First, developing a potential opportunity involves greater sunk costs (Northcraft & 
Wolf, 1984). Venture termination at this later stage is more difficult given the resources that 
have already been allocated and expended (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper & Woo, 1997). 
Nonetheless, firms that have experience in making decisions involving sunk costs are less 
likely to allow sunk costs to delay a decision to terminate a venture than firms that do not 
have the same level of experience (Garland, Sandefur & Rogers, 1990). Firms lacking 
development and exploitation stage experience are also likely to have fewer established 
practices and procedures and confidence for developing and exploiting ventures. This makes 
them more likely to remain committed to developed projects, and thus more likely to delay 
the decision to pull the plug on ventures that have reached that stage (Garland et al., 1990). 
Second, the developing stage typically involves advanced studies of feasibility and 
efficiency rather than initial exploration. Hence practices and procedures geared toward 
exploration, like probing for signs of opportunity, learning from small venture failures, and 
redeploying resources from one venture to another (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Sitkin, 1992; 
McGrath, 1999), will be less helpful in venture advancement in this stage, which calls for 
conducting cost-benefit analyses, refining, scaling, and achieving efficiency (Csaszar, 2013; 
Lavie et al., 2010; March, 1991). Compared to firms more focused on the development and 
exploitation of opportunities, a firm with a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage 
exploration activities is likely to need more time to collect information to assess the feasibility 
of a venture, and to have less confidence in their ability to make such assessments, which 
likely decreases the speed of the decision advance a venture at the developing stage. We 
hence offer our second hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: In the developing stage, a stronger attentional orientation toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities (a) decreases the speed of venture termination 
decisions, and (b) decreases the speed of venture advancement decisions. 
 
Interactions between Attentional Orientation and Environmental Dynamism  
Portfolios are often constructed to manage environmental uncertainty (Adner & 
Levinthal, 2004; Hoffmann, 2007). One critically important attribute of a venture’s 
environment is the level of dynamism, i.e., the degree of market change or volatility (Bakker 
& Knoben, 2015; Dess & Beard, 1984). Dynamism is a key variable in both the behavioral 
decision making (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947) and the decision speed literatures 
(Baum & Wally, 2003; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). Dynamism diffuses attention (Ocasio, 
1997) and erodes the value and applicability of prior experiences and operating procedures 
(Bakker & Knoben, 2015), hence can be expected to influence the nature of the relationship 
between attentional orientation and the speed at which firms make decisions. 
Prospecting Stage. Firms that frequently probe potential opportunities at earlier-stages 
of advancement are likely to be able to sense problems more quickly (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997; McGrath, 1999). However, to gain the necessary confidence when environmental 
dynamism is high, decision makers need to collect, track and analyze more information 
(Hambrick, Finkelstein & Mooney, 2005), and this slows down decisions (Qian, Cao & 
Takeuchi, 2013). Although the practices and procedures developed by firms with a higher 
degree of attention toward earlier-stage exploration activities may speed up venture 
termination at the prospecting stage, they are less likely to do so in a dynamic environment. 
This is so because when dynamism is higher, previously developed knowledge, experience, 
and confidence are less likely to be applicable to current decisions (Bakker & Knoben, 2015). 
As a consequence, when dynamism is high, firms with a higher degree of attention toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities are less able to capitalize on their stock of knowledge, 
experience, and confidence (Judge & Miller, 1991; Forbes, 2005).  
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When a firm with a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage exploration 
activities considers whether to advance a potential opportunity beyond the prospecting stage, 
the delaying effect caused by its limited experience, operating procedures, and decision 
making confidence for exploitation is likely to be exacerbated by a more dynamic 
environment. In a highly dynamic environment, obtaining information that enhances the 
accuracy of decisions is initially difficult (Dess & Beard, 1984). It takes time to collect, track, 
and analyze data (Hambrick et al., 2005; Qian et al., 2013). Furthermore, those with a higher 
degree of attention toward earlier-stage exploration activities have less knowledge of 
exploitation activities (Forbes, 2005) and hence a greater need to collect and analyze 
information on opportunities. This poses a greater challenge when environmental dynamism 
is high, because it makes the information that is available less reliable (D’Aveni, 1994). We 
hence offer hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3:  In the prospecting stage, a stronger attentional orientation toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities (a) increases the speed of venture termination 
decisions less, and (b) decreases the speed of venture advancement decisions more, 
when environmental dynamism is high than when it is low. 
 
Developing Stage. Because firms that orient more attention on seeking out new 
opportunities are likely to have fewer practices and procedures for making decisions on more 
developed ventures, they are likely to be more susceptible to the sunk cost effect (Garland et 
al., 1990), which leads to delays in decisions to terminate ventures (Adner & Levinthal, 
2004). This slowing of venture termination decisions is likely to be exacerbated by a dynamic 
environment. For one, information gathered in dynamic environments is less predictive, 
raising doubts about the accuracy of the initial assessment, and so causing even further delays 
in decisions to terminate ventures (Gimeno et al., 1997). Such doubt and hesitation are likely 
to be greater for decision makers whose firms have a higher degree of attention toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities because they are likely to be less able to rely on well-
developed practices and procedures, and hence are likely to have less confidence in assessing 
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more advanced ventures. This is likely to slow decision making speed (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Judge & Miller, 1991). 
Decision makers similarly need to be able to confidently assess the viability of a 
venture before giving it the green light to be advanced to the developing stage. Environmental 
dynamism can make viability assessment more challenging (Larrañeta, et al., 2013), even 
more so for firms with a higher degree of attention toward earlier-stage exploration activities 
as their experience and practices and procedures for exploration are likely to be less 
applicable to exploitation decisions (March, 1991). Thus, firms with a higher degree of 
attention toward earlier-stage exploration activities are likely to be disproportionally affected 
by the effects of a more dynamic environment. Based on this reasoning, we offer our final 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:  In the developing stage, a stronger attentional orientation toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities decreases the speed of (a) venture termination 
decisions and (b) venture advancement decisions more when environmental dynamism 
is high than when it is low. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample and Data Sources 
To test the above set of hypotheses, we study a sample of 3,269 Australian mineral 
exploration ventures over the 2002 to 2011 period. The mining industry is an important 
source of employment and economic growth globally, in part as a consequence of a gradual 
worldwide restructuring process that has caused a peak in demand for natural resources 
(Bakker, 2015; Taylor, 2011). Thirteen of the 50 largest companies in the world are involved 
in minerals and oil (Dicken, 2011). 
There are several reasons why mineral mining is a suitable context for our study. First, 
in mining, opportunities take the form of ore bodies that can be systematically assessed, and 
mining firms typically confront multiple potential opportunities at any given point in time. 
Second, while the mining sector represents a single industry, mining companies are usually 
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engaged in multiple mineral markets (e.g., gold, silver, platinum, etc.). This provides us with 
sufficient variance to study environmental dynamism. Finally, mining has distinct stages 
characterized by increasing and less-reversible investments as one moves forward in the 
process, and the decisions to terminate or advance mining ventures along the way is of critical 
importance. 
We gathered data from different sources. First, we used the Register of Australian 
Mining, a comprehensive, publicly available archive of reference books with annual data on 
all Australian mining companies, mining ventures, and directors. Our sample comprises all 
mining ventures listed in the Register. For publicly traded companies, the Register’s data 
collection is compiled from such diverse sources as Aspect Huntly, the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX), Bloomberg, Creamer Media, the London Stock Exchange, Marketwire, 
MBendi, Mining Weekly, MiningNews.net, Morningstar, Read Corporate, and Sedars, as well 
as from government and company websites and email alerts, and from annual and quarterly 
company reports. For private companies, the Register’s data collection is gathered and 
updated through direct contacts with those companies and through internet searches carried 
out quarterly (Bakker, 2015; Register of Australian Mining, 2012; personal communication). 
The data is available in digital form beginning with 2002. We checked data reliability by 
tracking the publicly traded companies through their ASX listings and cross-checking them 
with Morningstar and Sirca.  
We also obtained from the Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) 
monthly price data on a broad range of minerals traded on the open market. We linked mining 
ventures to their respective mineral using unique identifiers.  
Finally, we visited mine sites in Australia and interviewed a number of senior 
executives and consultants active in the mining industry. Although data gathered in this way 
were not formally used to test the hypotheses, what we learned from Australian mining 
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executives and industry consultants, and observed ourselves during visits to sites, gave us a 
more thorough grasp of opportunity evaluation in mineral mining.  
Bakker (2015) also draws on these data sources, but incorporates a different sample 
(1,025 mineral exploration alliances) and different independent and dependent variables. To 
the extent possible, we included the same control variables as Bakker (2015) in the present 
study. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable: Decision Speed. Our measure of decision speed captures the 
duration of time a mining venture spends in a stage before a decision is made to act on the 
venture. We began by capturing occurrences of decisions to advance and terminate mining 
ventures. Mining ventures in the prospecting stage are categorized as 1 (Advance to 
Developing) when a given venture at the prospecting stage at time t is listed at the developing 
stage at time t + 1, and as 2 (Terminate during Prospecting) when a venture at the prospecting 
stage that is present at time t is no longer present at time t + 1, and 0 otherwise. Mining 
ventures in the developing stage are categorized as 3 (Advance to Exploiting) when a given 
venture at the developing stage at time t is listed at the exploiting stage at time t + 1, and as 4 
(Terminate during Developing) when a venture at the developing stage that is present at time t 
is no longer present at time t + 1, and 0 otherwise. Our dependent variable captures the 
duration of time (Duration) to reach any of the 4 events—that is, the time it takes a venture in 
the prospecting stage to advance to the developing stage, or to termination, and for ventures in 
the developing stage, the time taken to advance to the exploitation stage or to termination.  
Of our sample of 3,269 mining ventures over a 9-year period, (i) 83 advanced from 
prospecting to developing. The average duration to reach this decision was 3.06 years (1118 
days); (ii) 1526 were terminated while prospecting. The average duration to reach this 
decision was 2.04 years (745 days); (iii) 74 advanced from developing to exploiting. The 
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average duration to reach this decision was 1.72 years (628 days); (iv) 132 were terminated 
while developing. The average duration to reach this decision was 1.89 years (691 days). 
Explanatory Variables: Orientation toward Earlier Stages of Opportunity 
Advancement. As we elaborated previously, we proxy a firm’s degree of attention toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities through its venture portfolio, because a venture portfolio 
reflects the firm’s actual resource allocation decisions hence represents the firm’s observable 
strategic choices (Cho & Hambrick, 2006) that result from, and are based on, attentional 
orientations. Prior research has measured portfolios using Blau (e.g., Powell, Koput & Smith-
Doerr, 1996) and Herfindahl indices (e.g., Wuyts & Dutta, 2014), or weighted means (e.g., 
Lin & Lee, 2011). We opted for a weighted means approach in which the weights reflect the 
average investment required at each stage, $0.6875 per ton for prospecting, $5.13 per ton for 
developing, and $76.00 per ton for exploiting (Hartman & Mutmansky, 2002). More formally, 
we measure a firm’s orientation toward earlier stages of opportunity advancement as: 
 
in which ni refers to the number of ventures in a firm’s portfolio at stage i at each stage 
(prospecting, developing, exploiting), and fi refers to the factor weight applied for each 
venture type i. We reversed the measure so higher scores reflect a stronger orientation toward 
earlier stages of opportunity advancement. Our measure incorporates the notion that different 
strategies compete for scarce resources (March, 1991) and is consistent with information we 
collected from key industry informants. 
 Our theoretical framework suggests that a firm’s orientation toward earlier stages of 
opportunity advancement is relatively stable over time. This notion is supported by our data. 
In addition to our standard one year measure, we developed 3-year and 5-year measures. They 
∑ni 
∑nifi 
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are highly correlated with the one year measure (.84, and .86 respectively). We tested the 
robustness of our results by replacing our one-year measure with a 3-year and 5-year firm 
average, and the results remain substantially unchanged.  
 As a final point, our data is project-centric, meaning that when a project is sold, it 
remains present in the database, but under a different owner. In other words, our measure of 
the dependent variable is not biased toward coding ventures that are sold as being terminated. 
As we will mention below, we control for ventures being sold/acquired through the dummy 
variable Acquisition. 
Environmental Dynamism.  Environmental dynamism is a time-varying covariate that 
captures the price variability of a mineral (i.e., its amplitude around the trend) over the 
preceding 12 months. Consistent with the approach used by Dess and Beard (1984) and Boyd 
(1990), we take a moving window of the standard error of the coefficient (beta) from a 
regression of time against the monthly price of a mineral. We used the mean of the dynamism 
score of each mineral when a venture was involved with multiple minerals.  
Control Variables 
 First, we controlled for Financial Capital. Availability of financial capital allows for 
exploration (Cyert & March, 1963), especially when opportunities are extremely costly as is 
the case with mining. Following George (2005), our time-varying measure of a firm’s 
discretionary slack is the log of the net financial assets of the firm owning the venture (in 
millions of Australian dollars). In the case of multiple owners, we used the sum of their net 
financial assets. 
Second, we controlled for other characteristics of the venture portfolio. We controlled 
for Portfolio Diversity because mining different types of minerals requires different skills and 
expertise. We counted the number of minerals mined by a firm, and divided it by its total 
number of ventures. We also controlled for the number of Prior Portfolio Decisions because 
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a firm’s decisions regarding a focal opportunity may be shaped by its previous decisions on 
other ventures in the portfolio. This variable captures the sum of the total number of prior 
termination and advancement decisions taken by the firm across its entire portfolio during the 
period of observation. In the case of multiple owners, we took the mean. 
Third, we controlled for characteristics of the venture itself. We control for Project 
Scope because the scope of a business venture has been linked to commercialization decisions 
(Shane, 2001). This variable takes a value of 0 when the project is involved with just one 
mineral (e.g., gold) and a value of 1 when there are two or more (e.g., gold and silver). In 
addition, by Acquisition we control for whether any given venture is sold during its lifetime. 
We mentioned that mining firms can survive by focusing on certain stages of the opportunity 
process, such that some miners can focus on exploration of new deposits, while others can 
access already existing opportunities at a later stage of development through acquisition. The 
variable Acquisition is coded 1 when a venture is acquired by a different firm over its 
lifetime, and 0 if it is not. 
Fourth, we controlled for firm ownership, governance, and company age. Venture 
Ownership measures the total number of parent firms involved in a venture in a given year. 
We log-transformed this time-varying covariate to account for skewness. Board’s 
Competence Breadth captures for each year the number of unique skills contributed by the 
firm’s board members (e.g., business administration, geology, human resources, etc.). 
Previous studies have related skills (Eisenhardt, 1989) and board experience (Judge & Miller, 
1991) to the speed of decision making. Therefore, we controlled for the Company Age of the 
firm owning the venture, which we measured by the number of years since its founding. In 
the case of ventures with multiple owners, we used the mean age of their owners. 
Finally, we controlled for other important market factors. First, Market Trajectory 
captures the mineral price trend over the previous 12 months. This measure is based on Dess 
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and Beard’s (1984) and Boyd’s (1990) measurement of munificence and is the coefficient 
(beta) of a regression of time against mineral price divided by the mean of the mineral price 
over the period. The resulting market trajectory score for each venture is a time-varying 
covariate based on a moving window of the mineral price in the previous 12-months. In the 
case of multiple mineral ventures, we took the mean of their respective scores. In addition, we 
control for macro-economic conditions with Interest Rate, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
official cash rate lagged one year.  
Analyses 
To test our hypotheses, we used a competing risks event history approach (Allison, 
1984). At each stage, each mining venture faces the competing risks of being terminated or 
advanced. Prospecting stage ventures are at risk of being advanced to the developing stage 
versus being terminated at the prospecting stage. Developing stage ventures are at risk of 
being advanced to the exploitation stage versus being terminated at the developing stage. In 
both stages, the baseline comparison to advancement and termination is delay, that is, not 
experiencing either event. Cases that do not experience an event during the entire period of 
observation are right-censored. Because there are too few ventures that have progressed all 
the way from initial prospect to operational mine during the observation period, we split our 
sample into two groups: ventures at the prospecting stage and ventures at the developing 
stage. There is no dependence between the models because they include different cases.  
We ran Cox competing risks regressions through the stcrreg module in Stata13. We 
estimated non-exponentiated coefficients; positive coefficients indicate that the hazard rate of 
a venture experiencing an event increases with changes in the covariate. Hence, positive 
coefficients indicate that an increase in the corresponding variable decreases the time it takes 
for an event to occur and therefore speeds up the occurrence of the event. Conversely, 
negative coefficients indicate that an increase in the corresponding variable slows down the 
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occurrence of the event (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004: 59). As our data comprises 
repeated observations for all explanatory variables, we modeled them as time-varying 
covariates with a time lag of one year. To account for a possible lack of independence 
between same-mineral ventures, we applied robust standard errors using the Lin and Wei 
method, which were clustered by mineral identifier. Consistent with prior studies using event 
history analysis (Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Iyer & Miller, 2008), our theory makes no 
assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard function. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports pooled descriptive statistics and correlations. The correlations among 
the explanatory variables are generally small to moderate, with the exception of some higher 
correlations between some of our control variables, namely between Portfolio Diversity and 
Venture Ownership (.52) and the Board’s Competence Breadth (.58), and between Venture 
Ownership and Prior Portfolio Decisions (.57). To verify that these correlations do not 
influence our findings, we ran collinearity diagnostics for all explanatory variables and found 
that collinearity is unlikely to confound our results (all VIFs are < 2.00). Furthermore, we ran 
all models with and without these control variables, and found that their inclusion or 
exclusion did not substantively alter the pattern of findings. 
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the Cox competing risks regressions of the timing 
of decisions on 3,269 mining ventures over the 2002–2011 period (6,563 venture-year 
observations). In Table 2, we study the antecedents of the competing risks of advancing a 
prospect to the developing stage (N=83) versus terminating it (N=1526). In Table 3, we study 
the antecedents of the competing risks of advancing a venture from the developing stage to 
the exploiting stage (N=74) versus terminating it (N=132). 
Page 29 of 57 Academy of Management Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we consider both statistical significance and effect size. 
To obtain an interpretation of the effect size, we used the procedure by Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones (2004: 60), to estimate the percentage change in the hazard rate as a function of 
increases in distinct values for the independent variable on the basis of its Beta coefficient. 
The coefficients in Table 2 and 3 provide support for H1a and 1hb. Specifically the 
results of Table 2 indicate that in the prospecting stage, a stronger orientation toward earlier-
stage exploration activities increases the hazard rate of venture termination (β = .04; p < 
.001). The size of the effect is such that a 1% increase in a firm’s orientation toward earlier 
stages of opportunity advancement increases the hazard rate of venture termination by 2.05%. 
Table 2 also shows that in the prospecting stage, a stronger orientation toward earlier-stage 
exploration activities decreases the hazard rate of venture advancement decisions (β = -.06; p 
< .001). The size of the coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in a firm’s orientation toward 
earlier stages of opportunity advancement decreases the hazard rate of venture advancement 
by 2.99%. 
Turning to the developing stage, Table 3 shows that a stronger orientation toward 
earlier-stage exploration activities decreases the hazard rate of venture termination decisions 
(β = -.08; p < .001), thus supporting H2a. The results show that a 1% increase in a firm’s 
orientation toward earlier stages of opportunity advancement decreases the hazard rate of 
venture termination at the developing stage by 3.98%. Finally, Table 3 reports that a stronger 
orientation toward earlier-stage exploration activities decreases the hazard rate of venture 
advancement decisions at the developing stage (β = -.07; p < .001), thus supporting H2b. A 
1% increase in a firm’s orientation toward earlier stages of opportunity advancement 
decreases the hazard rate of venture advancement by 3.49%. 
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Environmental dynamism turns out to have the hypothesized effects at the prospecting 
stage (H3a-b), but not at the developing stage (H4a-b). Specifically, as indicated in Table 2, 
the coefficient of the interaction between Orientation toward Earlier Stages of Opportunity 
Advancement and Environmental Dynamism has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on the event of terminating a venture at the prospecting stage (β = .01; p < .001) and a 
negative and significant one on the event of advancing a venture at the prospecting stage (β = 
-.01; p < .01). We plotted these interactions to determine the nature of the relationships. 
Figures 2a and 2b demonstrate the effects for levels of Environmental Dynamism one 
standard deviation above and below the mean, and provide support for Hypothesis 3a and 3b, 
that is, we find that in the prospecting stage, a stronger attentional orientation toward earlier-
stage exploration activities increases the speed of venture termination decisions less, and 
decreases the speed of venture advancement decisions more, when environmental dynamism 
is high than when it is low. Looking now at the contingent effect of Environmental 
Dynamism at the developing stage, Table 3 reports relatively small and statistically non-
significant effects for the interaction between Orientation toward Earlier Stages of 
Opportunity Advancement and Environmental Dynamism on venture termination and venture 
advancement at the developing stage. Hence, H4a and H4b are not supported.  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2a and 2b about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We performed additional analyses to verify the robustness of our findings. First, the 
strategies that firms use are not randomly chosen, they are based on their attributes and on 
industry conditions (Shaver, 1998). We therefore performed a Heckman correction to assess 
whether endogeneity influenced the effects of a firm’s Orientation toward Earlier Stages of 
Opportunity Advancement on our dependent variable. We followed the two-step procedure 
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suggested by Shaver (1998) and by Hamilton and Nickerson (2003). Specifically, we first ran 
a regression in which Orientation toward Earlier Stages of Opportunity Advancement is the 
dependent variable (selection model), calculated the inverse Mills ratio from that equation, 
and then added it to a probit regression of the various observed outcomes (outcome model). In 
the latter model we excluded two instrumental variables, Financial Capital and Acquisition, 
which are particularly strong predictors of Orientation toward Earlier Stages of Opportunity 
Advancement.4 The results indicate that the effects of firms’ orientation toward earlier stages 
of opportunity advancement are robust to correcting for endogeneity. In addition, we ran all 
the models separately for each predictor, with no other predictors or controls included, which 
ruled out the possibility that the effect can be explained by the venture portfolio being 
affected by market factors. 
Second, in our main analysis, we clustered the standard errors of the regression 
analysis by a unique mineral identifier. The ventures in our sample are also embedded in 
mining companies and so there could be a lack of independence between the values of 
company-level variables between ventures run by the same company. To assess whether this 
might bias our results, we re-ran all our analyses while clustering standard errors by a unique 
company identifier. In the case of a venture with multiple owners, we selected the owner who 
had the biggest total portfolio size, as these cases would cause the most bias. We found no 
substantive changes.5 
 Finally, to assess whether our findings were influenced by the skewed distribution of 
cases across outcomes (i.e., many cases experiencing a termination decision, and few 
experiencing an advancement decision), we also ran our analyses as standard non-competing 
                                                            
4 We ran a similar analysis using heckprob in Stata, and the results were the same. 
5 In addition, we ran logit regressions of each outcome, while simultaneously clustering standard errors by 
company ID and commodity ID using clus_nway (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller, 2001; Kleinbaum, Stuart & 
Tushman, 2013). All results were robust. 
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Cox regressions for each outcome separately. The results were almost identical to those 
reported above, thus increasing confidence in our results. 
DISCUSSION 
The simultaneous evaluation of multiple potential opportunities is a critical, yet 
challenging organizational activity (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011), particularly so when 
making speedy decisions is of the essence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Integrating insights from the 
behavioral decision making and learning literatures (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti et al., 
2007; March & Simon, 1958; Ocasio, 1997) with those from the literature on decision making 
speed (e.g. Choi et al., 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005), we theorized that attentional 
orientation, as reflected in a firm’s venture portfolio, influences decision speed toward focal 
opportunities. Challenging the view that organizations are typically either fast or sluggish 
regarding all the decisions they make, we proposed that a firm’s limited span of attention 
restricts the domains in which speed-enabling mechanisms can be developed (notably; 
experience, standard operating procedures, and confidence); hence depending on where the 
firm orients most of its decision makers’ attention, decision speed is likely to vary across 
assessments at different stages of opportunity advancement. An empirical study of Australian 
mining firms, which typically simultaneously pursue multiple potential opportunities at 
varying stages of development, provided support for this framework, indicating that firms 
with a stronger attentional orientation toward earlier-stage exploration activities are quicker to 
terminate early ventures but slower to do so later in their advancement, compared to firms 
that have a stronger attentional orientation toward development or exploitation. Firms with a 
stronger attentional orientation toward earlier-stage exploration activities are also slower to 
advance ventures at all stages. Importantly, we found support for our theorizing that 
dynamism moderates the relationship between attentional orientation and the termination and 
advancement decisions of early-stage ventures, however, we found that dynamism did not 
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significantly moderate the relationship between attentional orientation and later-stage 
termination and advancement decisions.  
These findings have a number of important theoretical implications. We will discuss 
these in the context of the two literatures most closely related to our research, namely, the 
literature on opportunity evaluation and the literature on decision speed. 
Implications for Research on Opportunity Evaluation  
How do decision makers evaluate potential opportunities and what factors influence 
those evaluations? Decision makers tend to think of acting on potential opportunities in terms 
of the first person (“a good opportunity for my firm”) rather than the third person (“a good 
opportunity for someone”) (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). As a consequence, firms tend to 
subjectively differ in their preference and pursuit of certain types of opportunities. For 
example, decision makers prefer potential opportunities that are cognitively close (Shook, 
Priem & McGee, 2003), that are related to their resource stock (Haynie et al., 2009), and to 
which they have some emotional attachment (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011). Hence the 
predominant answer provided by the literature so far has been that opportunity evaluation 
depends mainly on the resources, skills, and prior knowledge of actors, of the uncertainty, 
size, and stage of development of the potential opportunity, and of the relatedness of the two 
(Dimov, 2007; Haynie et al., 2009; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Our study suggests that a 
fuller answer to this question may entail capturing and understanding the opportunity process 
(Short et al., 2009), as well as the role of attention (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Ocasio, 1997). 
Regarding the opportunity process, we developed a three stage model informed by our 
Australian mining industry research setting. We believe it provides a valuable research 
framework for use in meeting a recent call (McMullen & Dimov, 2013) to more explicitly 
acknowledge and investigate time in opportunity research. An especially important 
contribution of the model is that it offers the basis for new insights into the opportunity 
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process—especially regarding decision speed as we will discuss below. Our investigations of 
the mining industry also revealed the importance of a middle stage in the journey of a 
potential opportunity (developing); a stage that has largely been ignored in the literature but 
which has the potential to provide important insights into both opportunity evaluation and 
advancement. Although potential opportunities at the developing stage are still being 
explored, the nature of the exploration is different from the earlier stage of exploration—
prospecting—and these differences impact decision making. Recognizing the importance of 
the process between early-stage exploration and eventual exploitation helps make sense of 
previous observations that the relationship between early-stage exploration and later-stage 
exploitation is often complex, has a substantial time lag, and involves considerable change 
(Ardichvili et al., 2003; Dimov, 2007; 2011). Our findings highlight the differences between 
decisions taken at these different stages of opportunity advancement, which opens up some 
new research opportunities. For example, while research on effectuation (Sarasvathy, 2001, 
2008) emphasizes that opportunities change over time, this process can also result in a 
portfolio of opportunities at different stages of advancement. The effectuation concept of 
affordable loss could be useful in explaining decisions to advance or terminate a focal 
potential opportunity given this portfolio context. 
An important contribution of our work is that we uncover the role of attention in the 
multi-opportunity evaluation process. Attention is a limited resource (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Ocasio, 1997), hence decision makers cannot simultaneously attend to all aspects of all 
possible opportunities they face. This notion of limited attention is important because it 
explains why a single firm may differ in the speed at which it makes different types of 
opportunity evaluation decisions. Furthermore, the role of attention allocation is salient when 
it comes to how firms will make trade-offs between choice sets external and internal to the 
firm. Building on recent research that has studied choices-sets external to the firm (e.g., 
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Barreto, 2012; Gruber et al., 2008; 2013), we actively considered the internal opportunity 
choice set, i.e., potential opportunities already under some form of active consideration—
those already in the firm’s portfolio. Besides demonstrating the relevance of internal choice 
sets, our study also leads to an interesting direction for future research: how does a firm’s 
portfolio—its internal opportunity set—influence the size and the nature of its external 
opportunity set?  On the one hand, one might expect that attention directed to an internal 
opportunity set (i.e., ventures in the portfolio) would reduce that directed to external 
opportunities—a substitution effect. On the other hand, the ability to choose between internal 
opportunities may help the firm recognize and pursue external opportunities—a magnification 
effect between the internal and external choice set. This, we believe, represents a fascinating 
question for future research. 
We now turn to a discussion on the moderating effect of environmental dynamism on 
the relationship between attentional orientation and the timing of decisions to terminate and 
advance potential opportunities. Our work adds to the small number of studies that, following 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000), consider the interrelationships between characteristics of 
the actor, market, and potential opportunity (Barreto, 2012; Bradley et al., 2012; Dencker et 
al., 2009). We find significant statistical support for a moderating effect of environmental 
dynamism for the initial phase of opportunity advancement (prospecting), but not for the 
subsequent phase (developing). This finding relates to a more general pattern in our data. In 
looking at the making of the two kinds of advancement decisions—prospecting to developing 
and developing to exploiting—we see that the effects of some of the important actor variables 
that were used as control variables (e.g., Financial Capital, Acquisition, Venture Ownership, 
Boards’ Competence Breadth, Company Age) grow stronger from stage 1 to stage 2, while 
the direct effects of Market Trajectory, Interest Rate, and Environmental Dynamism as well 
as the interaction effects between the firm’s Orientation toward Earlier Stages of Opportunity 
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Advancement and Environmental Dynamism become weaker. We speculate that this is 
because over time actors are likely to obtain increasingly precise site-specific geological 
information about the presence and size of particular mineral deposits and their approximate 
extraction costs. However, the risk associated with market conditions is not reduced to a 
comparable extent and thereby diminish the relative influence of environmental dynamism 
and other environmental factors in later stages of opportunity advancement. This reasoning is 
in line with Davidsson and Honig’s (2003) observation that the further into the exploitation 
process, the smaller the relative importance of macro or project unspecific variables. This 
change in the relative importance of environmental factors points to an interesting insight for 
theories of opportunities; the further into the exploitation process the more influence actors 
can have on the process through manipulating factors that are potentially within their control 
(e.g.,  project-specific factors) than through those that are largely beyond it (e.g., price and 
other macro environmental factors).  
 
Implications for Research on Decision Speed 
As mentioned above, the literature on decision making has predominantly viewed 
speed as a general attribute of the firm and/or its decision makers (Baum & Wally, 2003; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005; Judge & Miller, 1991). We find that it is important to 
distinguish between the speed of terminating a venture and that of advancing one. This 
distinction may at least partially reconcile the debate between the need for speed and that for 
uncertainty-reducing delay: the speed at which decisions are made is subject to a general 
tension between competing demands to act quickly to capitalize on an opportunity and to 
delay to allow time to better understand its value (Eisenhardt, 1989; Perlow, Okhuysen & 
Repenning, 2002; Kownatzki et al., 2014). Our findings suggest that it is important to be 
specific about the type of decision—termination or advancement—and the stage of 
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advancement—prospecting, developing or exploiting—because conventional mechanisms 
related to decision speed do not necessarily increase firms’ overall or intrinsic speed; rather 
we forward a theory that proposes that attentional orientation determines where speed-
enhancing mechanisms (experience, standard operating procedures, and confidence) are 
developed, hence increasing speed only for certain types of decisions, at certain stages of 
opportunity advancement. This more nuanced notion helps resolve the inconsistency between 
extant theory and an empirical reality in which firms sometimes make some decisions 
quickly, yet take a long time to make others. It also signifies attention as an important 
antecedent to decision speed that has thus far largely been overlooked in the literature.  
Our findings add an important contingency to our understanding of decision speed. 
Indeed, research on decision making speed has typically focused on either the speed of 
opportunity exploitation (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Choi et al., 2008) or on the 
importance of rapidly terminating ventures that show little promise (McGrath, 1999). In this 
study we take a step toward reconciling these two streams of research by investigating the 
speed of both. By theorizing and finding that the decision to terminate is not simply the 
flipside of the decision to advance a potential opportunity, we gain a deeper understanding of 
the connection between the two streams of research and specifically, the domain-specific 
processes that allow firms to make some decisions quickly, yet which do not necessarily 
extend to all decision making domains. In addition, our study opens up an opportunity for 
future research, namely: if decision speed is indeed situation-specific rather than a general 
firm characteristic, how does this influence the decision speed-firm performance relationship 
(cf. Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; Perlow, 
Okhuysen & Repenning, 2002)? 
Limitations and Future Research 
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Our study, as all studies, has limitations. First, we investigate one industry. While this 
increases the precision of our model and findings, we cannot be sure of the extent to which 
they apply to other industries. In particular, we speculate that the boundary conditions of our 
theory may well align with a distinction that Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi and Rowley (2010) 
made between alliances that are production-oriented and those that are R&D oriented. Our 
model and findings may apply more to production-oriented ventures than to creative R&D 
ones, or to those focused exclusively on learning. Such ventures may well be more iterative 
and short-lived (Bakker, Boros, Kenis & Oerlemans, 2013) than mining ventures, and their 
stages of development more fuzzy (Greve et al., 2010). 
Second, very few cases among those in our sample had progressed all the way through 
the opportunity advancement process within our 10 year observation period. For this reason, 
we could not study the sequence of multiple decisions—for instance, does a relatively longer 
or shorter period of initial prospecting prior to an initial advancement decision influence the 
speed of subsequent advancement decisions? Looking at other industries characterized by 
quicker venture progression or more dynamic portfolios might offer additional insights into 
the sequence of multiple decisions, and into relationships between different types of venturing 
decisions. Also, given the nature of our dependent variable, future research could use more 
fine-grained duration data (months rather than years), which could lead to more precise 
insights into decision speed. 
Third, we did not focus our analysis on the decision to start new exploration ventures 
during the observation period, although this could certainly lead to additional insights on the 
timing of decisions. Future research could fruitfully extend our work in this direction. 
A fourth limitation of our research is that, despite a sizeable sample overall, this study 
relied on some relatively smaller subsamples (N=83 and N=74, respectively) for ventures 
receiving advancement decisions, reflecting the nature of mineral mining in which only a 
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small minority of initial exploration prospects eventually become operational mines. Our data 
is also limited by the fact that it does not allow us to study whether a venture’s location is new 
(new to the firm and/or new to the industry), even though this could potentially influence the 
speed of termination and advancement.  
Finally, our empirical study did not include an assessment of performance. While we 
assume that firms will time their venturing decisions in a way that serves their best interest, 
we cannot provide direct evidence as to whether the firms that made faster decisions 
performed better. We would like to see future research that investigates whether it is speed 
per se that matters or whether fit is more important, meaning that timing decisions that are in 
sync with the venture and its environment may lead to enhanced performance (e.g., Ancona & 
Chong, 1996). We think that in so doing, future research could extend our work into a broader 
theory of the speed and dynamics of opportunity evaluation decisions. 
Managerial Implications 
A take-away from our findings is that managers, by focusing their attention toward 
certain types of decisions, can learn how to identify early signs that a potential opportunity 
does not show promise and terminate it quickly, or alternatively, how to look for signs of 
potential and push the potential opportunity through the advancement process quickly. Early 
decisions to terminate free up resources for prospecting, developing and exploring other 
potential opportunities, whereas quick advancements limit costs and maximizes upside 
potential. Managers that manage to focus their attention toward areas that are most relevant to 
the business’ future are more likely to develop experience, standard operating procedures, and 
confidence and hence be quicker to make “pull the plug” and “take the plunge” decisions in 
those areas that matter most to them. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlationsab 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
                      
1.   Terminate during Prospecting 0.23 0.42 .00 1.00 --                 
2.   Advance to Developing 0.01 0.11 .00 1.00 -.06 --                
3.   Terminate during Developing 0.02 0.14 .00 1.00 -.08 -.02 --               
4.   Advance to Exploiting 0.01 0.11 .00 1.00 -.06 -.01 -.02 --              
5.   Duration 2.15 1.39 1.00 8.00 -.04 .07 -.04 -.02 --             
6.   Financial Capitalb 4.94 .99 4.14 14.72 -.04 .01 .07 .06 -.03 --                     
7.   Portfolio Diversity .53 .31 .04 1.00 -.02 .03 .00 -.01 .09 -.09 --                     
8.   Prior Portfolio Decisions 4.08 4.26 .00 41 .15 .01 .03 -.02 .02 .11 .13 --                   
9.   Project Scope .09 .29 .00 1.00 -.01 -.01 -.03 .00 .06 -.06 .07 .01 --                 
10. Acquisition .45 .50 .00 1.00 -.18 .01 -.07 .01 .41 .01 .16 .23 .01 --               
11. Venture Ownershipb .26 .39 .00 2.08 -.02 .00 .02 -.04 .15 .13 .52 .57 .01 .29 --             
12. Board’s Competence Breadth .26 .30 .00 3.00 -.07 .03 .01 .04 .05 -.06 .58 -.06 .01 .10 .28 --           
13. Company Age 6.59 7.85 1.00 49.00 -.02 .00 .03 .03 .04 .16 -.02 .07 .02 .09 .08 .00 --         
14. Market Trajectory 1.08 4.07 -8.73 11.35 -.09 .02 -.03 .02 .04 .01 .00 -.04 -.01 .10 -.01 .04 .05 --       
15. Interest Rate 4.99 1.14 3.75 6.75 .08 -.02 -.05 .00 -.03 -.15 .06 .33 .12 .21 .12 .05 -.05 .09 --     
16. Environmental Dynamism -.04 1.44 -18.5 5.75 -.01 -.02 -.04 .01 -.03 -.04 -.04 .01 -.05 .03 -.02 .00 .01 .16 .09 --   
17. Orientation toward Earlier  Stages  
      of Opportunity Advancement 
1.71 2.90 .17 50.90 .05 -.04 -.12 -.08 -.02 -.19 .07 .01 .05 .02 .01 .03 -.13 -.02 .08 .04 -- 
                       
a N = 3,269 mining ventures over the 2002–2011 period (6,563 venture-year obs.). Correlations greater than │.03│ are statistically significant at p < .05. 
b Log-transformed 
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TABLE 2 
Cox Competing Risks Regression: Advancing vs. Terminating at the Prospecting Stage
ab
 
 
 
                            Advance to Developing                   Terminate during Prospecting 
Variables                  Model 1                     Model 2                   Model 3                              Model  1                Model  2                   Model 3 
    
Financial Capital .15 (.10) .10 (.10) .10 (.10) -.08***(.02) -.06***(.02) -.06**(.02)
Portfolio Diversity 
 
.88** (.32) .90** (.31) .89** (.31)  .20* (.08)  .18* (.08)  .18* (.08)
Prior Portfolio Decisions .06***(.01) .06***(.01) .06***(.01)  .07*** (.01) .07*** (.01) .07*** (.01)
Project Scope -.14 (.24) -.10 (.23) -.11 (.22) -.18* (.09) -.19* (.09) -.18† (.10)
Acquisition .29 (.25) .29 (.25) .29 (.25) -1.05*** (.04) -1.05*** (.04) -1.06*** (.04)
Venture Ownership -.92*** (.25) -.91*** (.25) -.91*** (.25) -.41*** (.09) -.41*** (.10) -.41*** (.10)
Board’s Competence Breadth  .65* (.26)  .65* (.27)  .65* (.27)  -.31**(.10) -.30**(.10) -.30**(.10)
Company Age .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) .01** (.00)  .01**(.00)  .01**(.00)
Market Trajectory 07* (.03) 07* (.03) 07* (.03) -.03** (.01) -.03** (.01) -.03** (.01)
Interest Rate  -.34***(.06) -.32***(.06) -.32***(.06) .08***(.02) .07*** (.02) .07*** (.02)
Environmental Dynamism -.03* (.02) -.03† (.02) .37** (.14) .00 (.02) .00 (.02) -.34*** (.07)
 
Orientation toward Earlier Stages of 
Opportunity Advancement 
-.06*** (.01) -.06*** (.01) .04***(.01) .04**(.01)
 
Orientation toward Earlier Stages of 
Opportunity Advancement X 
Environmental Dynamism 
-.01**(.00) .01***(.00)
 
 
Log Pseudolikelihood           -604.5                     -601.6                   -601.4         -11223.3  -11217.6       -11216.1
           a N = 3,269 mining ventures over 9 year period (6,563 venture-year obs.). Advance from prospecting: N = 83; Terminate while prospecting: N = 1526; censored: N = 1,660. 
b Table reports regression coefficients (not hazard ratios); robust standard errors (clustered by mineral) in parentheses. † p < .10;    * p < .05;   ** p < .01; *** p < .001   
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TABLE 3 
Cox Competing Risks Regression: Advancing vs. Terminating at the Developing Stage
ab 
 
 
                            Advance to Exploiting                    Terminate during Developing 
Variables                  Model 1                     Model 2                   Model 3                              Model  1                Model  2                   Model 3 
    
Financial Capital .30***(.07) .28***(.07) .28***(.07) .15***(.04) .12**(.04) .12**(.04) 
Portfolio Diversity 
 
-.18 (.35) -.08 (.38) -.08 (.39) .13 (.34) .13 (.34) .14 (.34)
Prior Portfolio Decisions  .01 (.03)  .01 (.03)  .01 (.03) .06** (.02) .06** (.02) .06** (.02)
Project Scope .06 (.36) .13 (.35) .13 (.35)  -1.26†(.69)  -1.18†(.68)  -1.18†(.69)
Acquisition .42**(.15) .46**(.15) .46**(.14) -1.15***(.16) -1.12***(.16) -1.12***(.16)
Venture Ownership  -2.05***(.55)  -2.07***(.56)  -2.07***(.55)  .26 (.31)  .28 (.29)  .28 (.31)
Board’s Competence Breadth 1.51***(.38) 1.50***(.38) 1.51***(.38) .40**(.14) .39*(.16) .39*(.16)
Company Age .02**(.01) .02**(.01) .02*(.01)  .02*(.01)  .02† (.01)  .02† (.01)
Market Trajectory 04 (.03) 04 (.03) 04 (.03) -.03 (.04) -.04 (.04) -.04 (.04)
Interest Rate  -.04 (.13) -.01 (.13) -.01 (.13) -.31**(.11) -.28*(.11) -.28*(.11)
Environmental Dynamism .19 (.18) .17 (.17) -.91† (.55) -.07***(.01) -.06***(.01) -.12 (.10)
 
Orientation toward Earlier Stages of 
Opportunity Advancement 
-.07*** (.01) -.08*** (.01) -.08***(.02) -.09***(.02)
 
Orientation toward Earlier Stages of 
Opportunity Advancement X 
Environmental Dynamism 
.02 (.01) .00 (.00)
 
 
Log Pseudolikelihood                     -533.9                     -527.1                     -526.5           -969.8     -953.7             -953.6
 
a N = 3,269 mining ventures over 9 year period (6,563 venture-year obs.). Advance from developing: N = 74; Terminate while developing: N = 132; censored: N = 3,063. 
b Table reports regression coefficients (not hazard ratios); robust standard errors (clustered by mineral) in parentheses. † p < .10;    * p < .05;   ** p < .01; *** p < .001   
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FIGURE 1 
Stages of Opportunity Evaluation 
 
 
 
  
Advance Advance 
 
 
1. Prospecting  
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3. Exploiting  
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FIGURE 2A 
Interaction Effect Plot: Terminating while Prospecting 
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FIGURE 2B 
Interaction Effect Plot: Advancing from Prospecting to Developing 
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Appendix A: Prospecting Potential Opportunities—Illustrations from Interviews with Industry Experts 
Description of Activities Terminating Advancing 
“Based on other occurrences around the area, based on maybe 
aerial mapping, geophysical and geochemical data that is already 
available … Essentially looking at the information that is 
available and saying well there is a trend here and we should pick 
that piece of ground up. So we have gone in and picked up 
various projects and what we then would do is go in and compile 
the information in detail, tread the ground and perhaps carry out 
some additional ground geophysics, more detailed work, or 
geochemical surveys and then we will drill.” 
“There is enough data around that you can get at. I still think that 
there is still a lot of things to be found that way. The second way 
is similar in one respect, you mine the mines department 
databases and there is a shit load of data there, we have got onto a 
couple of things because of that. These days the ground is open, 
so if you are lucky enough you find something interesting in the 
data, then you peg it. Then the third way is that you get out there 
and you do a lot of regional mapping and walk along.”  
“Prospecting is usually seen on ground and walking with foot and 
hammer and glass. … I found a silver mineralisation, high grade 
and I went back to the famers homestead, a big farm about 30, 
000 acres. I said that I got that on the creek up there. He said … 
Before you, five companies they come with helicopters and they 
land on top of a hill or they land a fella on top of the hill and the 
guy will be picked up and then they will go to the next hill or they 
land on a rock. He said, I have never seen them walk anywhere. 
They all come in choppers”. 
“In the several instances we have gone in 
there and drilled we have found some 
mineralisation but it has been uneconomic and 
we have made a decision that it is not going to 
make it, so we walk away.” 
“So it was still the exploration team who were 
making that decision and that is reasonably 
easy when they had gone and tested the 
concept and there had been nothing found. It 
becomes more difficult when you find a little 
bit and not quite enough to be economic and 
[this] decision... is one of the most difficult 
ones because that is a case where emotions get 
involved.” 
“Our mantra is that we want to work with 
mineralised systems, if you don’t have any 
mineralisation on the surface, you tend not to 
go out to the wild places.” 
“Each project is different, but the nickel project for 
example, you knew that you had rocks there so you could 
fly an airborne electromagnetic / magnetic survey for 
example and if there is nothing there, just walk away. If 
you did have a find, then you will say okay I will go to the 
next stage.” 
 “Where I put X is where we had the main mineralisation. 
It was just my knowledge of coast mines, my knowledge 
of gold and tin which is what I have mined in the past. ... 
So we did the magnetic and we found that we had lots of 
targets and we did the gravity and we have now come up 
with three major targets within what is called a job zone. 
This would have been like that, the rocks would have been 
doing that and they have gone whop. In the middle is a ten 
km wide zone which is absolutely fractured and smashed 
around. Because there is a weakness in the crust that is 
where you will expect minerals and hot magma coming 
out so now we have 60 metres to cover there and we have 
targets and we will go and drill them. Well we will see 
what comes out.” 
“I found gold over a kilometre in a totally new area. I used 
to go to the top to Laverton and the geologists from 
Muranda and Esso used to say what the hell are you doing 
there Fred? There is no gold there? You have got to be in 
the green rocks not the white rocks. I said that I am finding 
plenty of gold.” 
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Appendix B: Developing Potential Opportunities—Illustrations from Interviews with Industry Experts 
 
Description of Activities Terminating Advancing 
“I specifically picked up exploration permits which had 
known mineralisation on them so they already had some 
drilling in the past, in most instances a known mineral 
endowment. …  So there had been significant work done in it 
… a long history of quite successful exploration, while there 
were no resources identified there was a good tenor of 
mineralization indicated and that is what I aimed for.” 
“It is not easy to do to get the well drilled and the drill is 
often referred to as the lie detector. You are either going to 
make it or not.” 
“This is what we have to develop and drill wells all over the 
place and get the resource and collect it together and then we 
need to put it into some sort of processing plant to strip out 
the CO2 and the water and get it to pipeline specifications. 
You need a processing plant and then you need a 
pipeline…and the sort of pipeline that we are talking about it 
is a 48 inch line operating at schooper bottle pressure which 
is over 2000 PSI. ..In this case it would have to go to 
Gladstone which is over 2000 kms. Now that pipeline alone 
will be somewhere between 500 million and 1 billion 
dollars…. Then we would have to go into the only place that 
is open to us now…, and we can raise the money because all 
of a sudden with a reserve like that which is bankable…we 
can go out and borrow money.” 
 “… we did actually acquire a project which we 
thought was a development project and we went 
out there and converted it into a resource, the 
resource hadn’t been defined previously. We did a 
scoping study which involved employing a 
metallurgist consultant and consultant engineers 
and so we took it to that point. At that point it was 
not economic, it didn’t progress.” 
“Our guys had to think about it and so the second 
stage would have to have a goal that if there is 
going to be a mine we will probably have to 
produce 15,000 tonnes of nickel over ten years to 
be of any value to the company. So you can work 
out roughly the size of the body, so you can say 
estimate that the target would need to be say one 
kilometre long. If you put ten holes into the target 
zone, and you still haven’t got anything, well you 
aren’t going to make it. Just walk away.” 
“…  the boss of [company name] over a period of 
20 years drilled 100 dry holes. He was known as 
“100 dry hole Jeff”: 100 not out.” 
 “So in that area, we found deposits of 100 million 
tonnes and we are doing quite a bit of work. Everyone 
said God that is remote. Where are you going to get the 
water from? We then bit the bullet and then in December 
we drilled a very deep hole down in the underlying basin 
and we found a huge amount of water. Massive. Right 
under the mine site where you want it. That was very 
successful, that made it feasible. Without the water there 
is no mine. We are still progressing and we are all very 
happy now and it will take another year and a bit to get 
through the government compliance and then we will be 
in a position to start looking at the full feasibility and get 
it finished. That was one thing. People said that was 
magnificent, how the hell did you guys go into the 
middle of nowhere and find something like that. No one 
had ever explored there… In one a half a km across and 
5.5 kms long and we will be mining 1300 tonnes an hour 
and mining 10 million tonnes a year. So that is some 
point in the future.” 
“So we started doing some iron work and we got some 
good hits and then  rather than drill off the side of the 
magnetic anomaly we drilled the guts of the anomaly and 
we got the iron discovery. If they hadn’t offered it up to 
us we probably wouldn’t be looking in that area.” 
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